Peace Negotiation with Afghan Taliban
[30.Apr.2015 - 22:21]لیک : شاه محمود میاخیل By:Shahmahmood. Miakhel
په ۲۰۰۹ م کال کې ما د صلح په هکله یوه مقاله په انګلیسی ژیه لیکلی وه فکر کوم چې اوس هم قابل د لوستلو ده.
تر څو چې مونږ د حکومتداری په هغه برخه کې چې زمونږ په لاس کې ده او مونږ پری کنترول لرلی شو فوکس ونه کړو او زمونږ د ولس اعتماد په حکومت پیدا نشی تر هغې د صلح خبری نتیجه نه ورکوي. کله چې دا جوته شوله چې زمونږ حکومت (نظام ورته لا ویلی نه شو) قوی دی، سقوط نه کوی او په خپلو پښو ودریدلې شي نو بیا خبري نتیجه ورکوي او پاکستان هم شاید خپلی ستراتیژي ته تغیر ورکړي.
Peace Negotiation with Afghan Taliban: Options and Constraints
16 March 2009
Introduction:
After coalition forces started operations in Afghanistan in October 2001, some Taliban forces were killed or arrested, while majority of them escaped to Pakistan and the tribal belt between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Many of those Taliban were able to reintegrate into their communities. However, when the last stronghold of the Taliban was captured in early December 2001, a security vacuum was created which was filled by warlords or Mujahiden commanders who were defeated by Taliban, and who were hated by the majority of Afghans. Many Taliban or their supporters who wanted to have a peaceful life in their communities were threatened by warlords who were part of the new transitional government that was installed by the Bonn Agreement in December 2001.
Prior to the Bonn Agreement, Mr. Burhanuddin Rabbani, who was the de facto President of Afghanistan, became Chairman of the new government after collapse of Taliban and reappointed those same Mujahiden commanders or bureaucrats, who were removed by Taliban, to their original positions. As a result, many warlords and Mujahiden commanders became provincial and district governors or chiefs of police. In essence, the reappointment of old enemies of the Taliban in the government positions, after occupying their official positions, started targeting Taliban and their supporters. Taliban and their supporters didn't have any option but to fight against the government and international forces. While some escaped and rejoined Taliban ranks and files, others provided clandestine support to them or other anti-government elements (AGEs), and have also been supported by some elements in neighboring countries. Gradually, the number of these insurgents, especially in the last three years, has grown significantly. In most parts of the South, South-East, East and Central regions, which represent almost half of the country, insurgents or criminals, are in charge during the night, and the government or international forces are in charge during the day. In some parts of the country, the government and international forces are even confined to their bases or district headquarters, which is reminiscent of the situation that developed in the early 1980s as the communist regime and its Soviet allies lost ground against the Mujahidin.
Despite significant progress in the development sector in the last seven years, the security situation is getting worse, and Afghanistan is heading into downward spiral. I know some individuals in the international community do not believe that Afghanistan is in a downward spiral, but this is the reality on the ground that ordinary Afghans experience it every day. After seven years of enormous efforts, the international community at a crossroads and more and more people are quietly thinking that, if there is no military solution, then what would be the best exit strategy from Afghanistan. Some members of the international community are of the view that there is no military solution in Afghanistan; it is important to lower expectations to build ideal Afghanistan, it would be good and easy to talk with the Taliban and AGEs such as the Hezb-e-Islami of Hekmatyar and the Haqqani Network. Some members of the international community are even considering ways to outsource the security of Afghanistan to its neighbors.
Before entertaining the idea of beginning talks with factions currently opposed to the government of Afghanistan, it would be best to consider what this course of action would entail a desirable outcome. In essence, there are three options for negotiation.
1. Option number one is reconciliation with Taliban as a whole as an organization, including top leadership;
2. Option number two is negotiation with moderate Taliban which are so called reconcilable; and
3. Option number three will be to negotiate with those Taliban or insurgents who joined with the insurgency for personal reasons and make a deal with them on the local level to address their specific concerns and create a space that they will be able to live as normal citizens and have a normal life.
It would be good to examine these three options.
Option (I): Negotiation with top leadership of Taliban as an organization
Let's first examine the public statements of different actors in the last few months regarding reconciliation with the top leadership of the Taliban:
On 16 November 2008, President Hamid Karzai said, "If I hear from [Omar] that he is willing to come to Afghanistan or to negotiate for peace ... I, as the President of Afghanistan, will go to any length to provide him [with] protection." He further said, "If I say I want protection for Omar, then the international community has two choices: remove me or leave (Afghanistan) if they disagree."
A NATO commander, in response to this statement of President Karzai said, "It is ridiculous to think that Mullah Omar would be willing to come to the negotiating table now…This is the man who draped himself in the cloak of the Prophet and declared himself commander of the faithful. He has nothing to gain by negotiating, and we have nothing to gain by offering talks when the Taliban think they are winning."
Taliban's Deputy Mulla Brother , rejecting this overture of Mr. Karzai, told Reuters via satellite telephone, "We are safe in Afghanistan and we have no need for Hamid Karzai's offer of safety.” He added that foreign forces had to leave before the start of any negotiations. "As long as foreign occupiers remain in Afghanistan, we aren't ready for talks because they hold the power and talks won't bear fruit ... The problems in Afghanistan are because of them."
Just recently on 11 March 2009, AFP quoted Pentagon's Press Secretary, Mr. Jeoff Morell, regarding reconciliation with Mulla Omar as saying that he did not believe "that anybody in this building (Pentagon) would support the notion of reconciling with people with that kind of blood on their hands." US Defense Secretary Robert Gates was quoted by the same source as indicating that, "There are elements of the Taliban that are absolutely irreconcilable and frankly will have to be killed." Gates further said, "I think almost all insurgencies in the end game involve political reconciliation. The issue is it needs to be on the terms of the government of Afghanistan."
Recently, Mullah Omar, top leader of Taliban showed some interest and approved the peace talks which are sponsored by the Government of Saudi Arabia. This possibility was rejected, however, by the Taliban’s purported spokesman Yousuf Ahmadi who told AFP by telephone, "We'll not talk to anybody unless the invading foreign forces leave Afghanistan." He further said, "Such statements are baseless lies."
If the above few statements to be examined, the government of Afghanistan, the US administration, NATO officials and Taliban top leadership are not on the same page, or not even closer to each other on the issue of negotiation with the top Taliban leadership. The UN is already restricted by resolution 1267 to not deal with those people who are on its list of international terrorists, which includes Mulla Omar and the top leadership of the Taliban. This means that negotiation with top leadership of the Taliban as an organization would be extremely difficult to arrange or justify.
If the top leadership of the Taliban is excluded from negotiation, it means that the international community is not ready to talk with Taliban as a whole or as an organization. This again means that the international community, the government of Afghanistan and Taliban are not on the same page.
Option (II): Reconcile with moderate or reconcilable Taliban:
If negotiation with the top leadership of the Taliban is excluded as an option, there remains the possibility of negotiating with so-called “moderate” Taliban. Again, let's review a few public statements in this regard.
In an interview with the New York Times on March 7, United States President Barack Obama said that he hopes, “U.S. troops can identify moderate elements of the Taliban and move them toward reconciliation". According to the New York Times, he said the United States "was not winning the war in that country" and thus the door must be opened to a "reconciliation process in which the American military would reach out to moderate elements of the Taliban much as it did with Sunni militias in Iraq".
President Karzai said about the above statement of President Obama, "This is approval of our previous stance and we accept and praise it," In fact, President Karzai's statement is not according to his previous stand because he wanted to have reconciliation even with Mulla Omar and Hekmatyar. For the sake of argument, however, it can be said that both Obama and Karzai agree on the strategy of negotiating with those Taliban who are reconcilable with the Afghan government.
A purported spokesman of the Taliban, Qari Mohammad Yousuf, when asked if the top leader of the Taliban, Mullah Omar, would like to make any comment about President Obama's proposal, he said, "This does not require any response or reaction, for this is illogical". He said, "The Taliban are united, have one leader, one aim, one policy...I do not know why they are talking about moderate Taliban and what it means?" He further said, "If it means those who are not fighting and are sitting in their homes, then talking to them is meaningless. This really is surprising to the Taliban."
It is not surprising that the top leadership of the Taliban would deny the existence of potential breakaway factions, but the fact remains that there is no clear vision for how to identify reconcilable and non-reconcilable Taliban. The government through the under reconciliation process (PTS) chaired by Professor Sebghatullah Mujadedi, have given certificates to more than 6,000 people who joined the peace process through PTS but the significance of this achievement has always been questioned.
Mr. Hanif Atmar, Interior Minister of Afghanistan at the time, dismissed the strength of Taliban and told reporters in Washington DC that only 10-15,000 Taliban are fighting inside Afghanistan. If the active members of Taliban are this few in number, then the question is why ANSF and ISAF, that are 15-20 times greater in number than the Taliban, but cannot defeat them? According to the Ministry of Haj and Awqaf (Religious Affairs Ministry), there are 166,000 mosques in Afghanistan and 322 registered Madrasas, which enrolled about 100,000 students. If each mosque has one leader of prayer, their number will be 166,000. Leaders of prayers in 6000 of these mosques are appointed or under the supervision of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Also, there are Ulema Shuras (religious councils) in each districts and provinces. They are established by the Ministry of Haj and Awqaf as well as by the Council of the Ulema which was headed by former Chief Justice, Maulavi Fazal Hadi Shinwari. The total number of both councils reaches to about 7500 religious scholars. Now the question is why this big network of religious students and Ulema that is linked or supported by the government cannot convince or stop the small number of Taliban who are fighting in Afghanistan? Also, if we look to those religious scholars who support the government, they are better known and religiously more educated than the top leadership of Taliban, who are often poorly educated and least well-known in the country as religious authorities. Even the few well-known members of Taliban leadership are not known religious scholars and are not in the position or have the authority to issue Fetwas or religious edicts. Mulla and Talib are the lower ranks of the religious hierarchy. The Taliban spokesman is right to say that talking with those Taliban who are not fighting or so-called moderate Taliban would be meaningless, since otherwise tens of thousands of them would support the government. There are a lot more religious scholars in the country than there are Taliban. But what does that have to do with negotiating with moderate Taliban?
Some people in the international community, especially from some neighboring countries, though significantly not from Pakistan , believe that if after the defeat or withdrawal of the international community, should the government of Afghanistan was to collapse, the Taliban will take over as the victorious forces. This would be a big disaster for the region and the Taliban's incursion would not stop here in Afghanistan, but would spread beyond its borders to Central Asia. In this worst case scenario, it would be good to select a less painful scenario and start negotiations with the moderate Taliban and to have a shared government. In this scenario, the Taliban would not be in a strong position to threaten their neighbors. One question that arises from this scenario is if international community and government of Afghanistan succeeded in convincing the Taliban to have a coalition government, would Afghanistan have a stable government or not? I believe that Afghanistan will not have a stable government and the government would collapse from inside and the Taliban would again take control of all affairs because of weak and fragmented government institutions. In this scenario, Taliban, once agree on sharing power, would be in a very strong position and would become over time a big threat to our northern and western neighbors and an even greater threat to our eastern neighbor, Pakistan as well because Taliban are more organized and stronger in Pakistan comparison to Afghanistan.
Option (III): To have local deals with insurgents:
In considering the third option, it is useful to take into account the reasons for the insurgency in the first place. According to one source, 20% of the violence in Afghanistan is associated with the Taliban, while 32% is related to communal problems, 28% is related to conflict over resources, and 20% is related to factional conflict. If these statistics are accurate, then it is fair to say that insurgency in Afghanistan can only be defeated by good governance and functional and effective government institutions. Without functional institutions, it is not possible to solve insurgency problem in Afghanistan through peace talks with moderate or reconcilable Taliban.
As an example, in the end of July 2009, local government in Badghis province reached to an agreement of understanding with local Taliban which was confirmed by one of Mr Karzai's spokesman, Siamak Hirawi. He said: "A ceasefire has been established in Bala Murghab district of Badghis province through the efforts and mediation of elders and influential people of the province…This is a model that other provinces and areas are also trying to use. Amir Tawakal, provincial council member of Badghis province in an interview with Radio Azadi (Radio Free Europe) Pashto service on 28 July 2009 confirmed the peace deal with the Taliban and mentioned that it will only work if local governance improved. In Bala Murghab district of Badghis province, the main problem is between Pashtun, Tajik and Uzbak groups. In the local government setup, Pashtuns are least represented, but by appointing a new governor, Delibar Jan Arman, who is a Pashtun from Khost province and a member of the Hezb-e-Islami party, it is hoped that resentments might be overcome and local Taliban might be convinced to have a peace deal.
The local tactic used by Afghan government and international forces is to divide the Taliban. However, one must be careful not to give one isolated situation too much general significance Each area in Afghanistan is unique, and more importantly, local peace agreements can be both transitory and less meaningful than it first appears. Thus, according to Mullah Malang, an independent member of the Afghan National Assembly said that the truce was paid for in cash and broke down just hours after it was signed. He said, "I have no confidence in this agreement. Under the agreement, both Taliban and government troops will be moved back, but it is just for the election and people are saying some Taliban and local people have been paid,". Even if this deal works in Badghis province, due to transient nature of insurgency, local Taliban could quickly move to another province or district and begin fighting there.
Conclusion:
If we look to at the above three options, it is obvious that none of them can be implemented under the current situation. For option number one, the international community and the government of Afghanistan are not in agreement. If it is assumed that the government and Taliban can reach an understanding to have reconcile with the Taliban as an organization and give them a chance to be in the government, at the same time they are offered some cabinet, governorships or other positions, the result will not be a stable government; most likely it will led to civil war again because their ideological difference are vast, and this will be a big defeat for everyone.
Secondly, if the government and international community want to reconcile with moderate Taliban, politically this might sound good, but practically it doesn't make sense, because it is impossible to identify moderate Taliban and differentiate them from the many thousands of religious figures in the country, who at least nominally support the government. Increasingly, the term Taliban itself is used by all insurgents and criminals, regardless of their political orientation or lack thereof. Therefore, no one has yet been able to invent an instrument to measure the mindset of those associated with the Taliban and no one can adequately say what or whom is moderate, extremist or fanatic. Such formulas were used several times by communist regimes in 1980s and 90s to reconcile with the Mujahiden, but none of those formulas were successful in helping the communist government of the time.
Option three to make deals with Taliban or insurgents locally, it would only be possible if the ANSF gets better and stronger and if local governance is improved. With the current weak status of the ANSF and bad governance in the country, it is not possible to separate different element of insurgency from each other in Afghanistan.
The majorities of the Afghans believe that bringing Taliban back to power is not a solution and don’t want to turn the clock backward. Most of the Afghans also believe that the Taliban have not changed and will re-impose their harsh role again. Just recently, the Taliban commander in Helmand province, Mohammad Ibrahim Hanafi, in an interview with CNN on 15 March 2009, said that, "Our law is still the same old law which was in place during our rule in Afghanistan... Mullah Mohammad Omar was our leader and he is still our head and leader and so we will follow the same law as before."
When people say that there is no military solution to the problem of Afghanistan, it doesn’t mean to go and talk with insurgents only. In fact, it means that the door should be kept open for all insurgents who want to lay down their arms and live in peace - but at the same time, more focus should be given to good governance and institution building. I believe, wasting more time and resources and diverting attention from the real problem of Afghanistan will be misleading and cannot resolve the current problem. It would be good to direct all efforts and resources to institution building and start major projects in all regions to find jobs to young generation not to be recruited by Taliban. Peace talks and negotiation are only possible when Afghanistan has functional institutions, where corrupt officials are not appointed at the highest levels of government, and can negotiate with moderate or non-moderate insurgents from position of strength rather than weaknesses. At present, the government and international community are not in a strong enough position to separate moderate or reconcilable insurgents from non-reconcilable elements or even to make deals on the local level.
If the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) get enough strength to protect people during the day and night and improve governance, then it is possible to separate different elements of the insurgency from each other and keep open the door for those who want and are willing to stop fighting in Afghanistan. In this scenario, the people will cooperate with the government, and it is possible that most insurgents will stop fighting and support the government. When grassroots governance is improved and the government was able to establish security on local levels, it is possible that some Taliban will change side. Otherwise, there is no incentive for the Taliban to change side to the government whose future existence is uncertain and has no control in most of the country, especially during the night just like failure of past communist regime.