A Plan to Stabilize Afghanistan
Abstract (December 2009) Afghanistan’s problems are well-known: insecurity, corruption, poverty and weak governance. Unfortunately most proposals lack a clear implementation strategy, making them more like wish lists than concrete roadmaps. This paper identifies the failings of previous security, governance and development planning, and proposes an alternative: the creation of teams of qualified police, military and civilian personnel from Kabul to conduct “security audits” at the village and district level to assist in force allocation, convene shuras to implement locally-determined programs, ensure responsible district-level governance, and adopt a development strategy driven by local needs. These teams would have the authority to remove civil servants, approve police structure and assign development funds, which would encourage accountability at the local level. In the long term, the government must improve representation, reduce waste and reform the civil service. This paper argues that with using available resources and capacity or with few additional resources, this plan could result in concrete, tangible improvements in security, governance and development. The author emphasizes that while Afghan expectations are modest, the Government of Afghanistan and the international community are running out of time to deliver. Introduction For the past seven years, I have occupied senior positions within the Government of Afghanistan and at the United Nations. I am familiar with most of the programs and strategies implemented by both the Government of Afghanistan and the international community. Most of those strategies are supported by bulky documents replete with sophisticated language describing lofty goals, but they seldom contain a succinct implementation plan that is clear to the average government employee or citizen. In February 2009, I attended a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) conference at the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) headquarters in Kabul attended by roughly 250 high-level representatives from international organizations and institutions along with officials from the Afghan government. Various programs and strategies such as Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS)[2], Afghanistan Compact[3], Afghanistan Sub-National Governance Policy[4], new Anti-Corruption Strategy to be implemented by High Office of Oversight (HOO)[5] aiming to stabilize the security environment, fight corruption, improve governance and development were presented and discussed. I was mystified by the lack of substance in the discussions, a sentiment that I found was shared by other participants. It compelled me to compile a set of ideas on how to address Afghanistan’s many problems in a straightforward, understandable manner that could be implemented in the short and medium terms. This paper lays out those ideas in the form of a strategic plan for Afghanistan, in the hope that it can spur new thinking on Afghanistan among Afghan and international policy makers. Background In March and June 2009, while working for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) as a Governance Advisor, I wrote two papers detailing a simple, understandable strategy for Afghanistan with the focus of achieving stability. In this document, I attempt to combine those two papers to show how security, good governance and development can be achieved within the present context of Afghanistan. It is very important for the international community and the new administration of Afghanistan to work closely to clearly define the roles and responsibilities of each party and ensure better coordination. It is equally important for the three pillars of power in Afghanistan (government, religious establishment[6] and people) to work and trust each other. These three pillars of power can only work together if there is transparency in the process of decision making and participation on local level regarding all issues of security, governance and development. In this coordinated effort, it is extremely important for the Government of Afghanistan to take the lead. No plan, program or strategy in Afghanistan will succeed without the Government of Afghanistan playing the lead role at all levels. Afghanistan has a unique geographical position. It is not part of Middle East, Central Asia or South Asia. Afghanistan stands at the crossroads of these three regions, but its culture, values and history diverge from all three. It is important to appreciate that reconstruction programs that may have worked in other post-conflict countries may not have traction in Afghanistan. Afghanistan has been at war for thirty years (occupation, civil war and proxy wars) but no tribe or group has ever attempted to break away from the country to create a separate state, as is the case for most of Afghanistan’s neighbours. Afghanistan can be understood as a strong nation with a perpetually weak state. The Failure of Previous Security, Governance & Development Programming Strategies and programs in Afghanistan have suffered from several serious flaws. First, they have thus far been largely supply-driven; they are focused on the capabilities of donor nations, not based on the needs of the Afghan people. Second, most programs are designed to achieve short-term, tactical gains. In 2002, more focus was on building Afghan National Army (ANA) for counterterrorism purpose and less focus on building Afghan National Police (ANP). It took three years for the government of Afghanistan to convince big donor such as the US to invest in the training of Afghan National Police force. But it was too late that the police will do policing job to meet law and order requirement of the citizens. When they realized that the police are in the first line of war to fight against insurgency and normal police force didn’t have capability to cope with existing security challenges, the government of Afghanistan and international community started to recruit people for Auxiliary Police (AP) in 2006. When the International community realized that AP strengthened power of warlords and criminal networks, they stopped supporting AP and started to support Arbaki (community police force) or Afghanistan Public Protection Force (APPF) in 2008. This is inconsistent with the goal of institution building, which is anything but a short-term process. Typical strategies, programs and papers on Afghanistan have many problematic features in common: Most of these strategies are wish lists with no implementation frameworks. And even if some of the programs have been implemented successfully, long-term sustainability is questionable. For example, Afghanistan Compact under Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights section mentioned,”…establish a more effective, accountable and transparent administration at all levels of Government; and implement measurable improvements in fighting corruption, upholding justice and the rule of law and promoting respect for the human rights of all Afghans”. If we look to the above one paragraph of Afghanistan compact and the goals mentioned could not be implemented in decades. Most of these strategies, programs and papers are written by foreign consultants rather than local experts. They often cut and paste from programs and strategies from other countries without adapting them to Afghanistan’s unique socio-cultural and political milieu. Almost all security, governance and development programs in Afghanistan are designed for post-conflict situations which do not address all of Afghanistan’s current challenges of insecurity. Many of these experts and consultants believe that there has never been a functional government in Afghanistan’s history. Consequently, they want to start everything from scratch. Quite to the contrary, Afghanistan had a functional government before 1978 for nearly four decades. It enjoyed a lively and open economy and environment. Therefore, most of the rules and procedures for better governance are already in place. Of course it could use modifications in some areas, but generally the outlines of a good administrative system, familiar to Afghans, is in place. Another problem with current programs is that they have been unable to sustain momentum through personnel changes. When one consultant leaves, the replacement re-starts the process again, without reviewing or building on previous work. This shortcoming is further exacerbated by the incompetency of personnel in some departments and ministries who do not properly utilize the expertise of these consultants or advisors. Too often, donors work with individuals rather than with institutions. When one of these individuals moves to another government ministry or department, they take all of the resources with them. The power accumulated by these individuals has prompted some to refer to them as “Civil Society Warlords.” Most of the strategies developed for Afghanistan in recent years have been long, highly technical and often poorly translated, if at all, into Pashto and Dari. They are simply incomprehensible to the average government employee or Afghan who is expected to implement them. During the past eight years, the administrative system of Afghanistan has been dismantled like the engine of a car and now the government of Afghanistan and the international community are having difficulty putting all these pieces back together. Afghanistan had an administrative system which was developed in several decades and most of the government machinery at least know how to operate it but unfortunately the international community came with mentality that there is no system in Afghanistan. Instead of gradual changes, they dismantled the old administrative, judicial and security systems and not able to build new one which could be understandable by average Afghans and government machinery. In some cases, they are attempting to fit pieces from an entirely different make of car into the engine. The Reality on the Ground During the past few months, I have spoken with citizens from across Afghanistan. I personally visited Kunduz, Takhar, Paktia, Khost, Kunar and Nangahar provinces. Most complained about the lack of security and bad governance in their respective areas. When asked, however, about the progress in development and changes to their standard of living, there was unanimous agreement that since 2001, there has been unprecedented improvement, despite bad governance, corruption and insecurity. Economically, everyone is living a better life today compared to seven years ago, but there are still complains. While there is need for more economic development, the main concerns for the people of Afghanistan are security and good governance. As Botanies measure their progress with Gross Happiness rather than by GDP, it is the same in Afghanistan that Gross Happiness is missing point. The Government of Afghanistan and the international community have to look into the management of each department and ministry and find out where the problems lie. It may be due to poor leadership, bad management, problematic organizational structures or deficits in resources. Again, thinking of the government as a car, one may improve governance and security in a district simply by changing the driver (leadership), while in another place, fuel (resources) is needed, while somewhere else, an engine change is needed (perhaps increasing the number of police officers, which might possibly be thought of as adding a turbocharger). Different places will have different requirements. None of these issues can be solved solely from Kabul. They involve local initiatives, decisions and actions. While a federal system in Afghanistan could have very negative consequences, the delegation of authority to the local level to identify problems and make quick decisions is imperative if the insurgency is to be defeated and governance is to be improved. The idea of working around the central government, an idea proffered by some people, is not practical or feasible. No stable country in the world exist without some sort of central and local functional government. If there is no functional government in a country at all levels, there is no stability. In the case of Afghanistan, there is no way to circumvent the central government because even the district governor is appointed by the central government. There should be balance approach between centralization and decentralization. Under current circumstances in Afghanistan, more power should be delegated to the local level governance and the central government should play monitoring role. Short term objectives are the enemy of long term goals. Over the past eight years, the international community and the government of Afghanistan sought quick fixes with inexpensive price tags. They did not succeed. Instead, reforms created job insecurity, especially within the civil service and police force. These reforms manipulated by those who had power, money and influence and thousands of qualified people in the government or police forces have no jobs or appointed in passive positions. There is no motivation to serve in the government. Going into greater detail of why more insecurity was created would take too long, but unequivocally, the reforms did not improve security and good governance. Short-term programs must support long term goals in building a foundation for sustainable peace and stability in Afghanistan. If the government of Afghanistan and international community mobilize local capabilities and resources, establishing synergies between existing programs and institutions, Afghanistan could be stabilized very quickly. To implement the plan outlined below, it will be important to create several centers of gravity from which to improve security, governance and create conducive conditions for development. These centers would have to be agreed jointly by the government and the international community. From these centers, implementation could then expand outward to the rural areas of Afghanistan. The structure suggested here would create an atmosphere that would encourage the populace and even the AGE (Afghanistan Government Enemies) to support the government gradually. A New Strategic Plan First Steps Together, they must agree on a common and united agenda with both sides fully dedicated to deliver on their commitments. The people of Afghanistan do not distinguish between the government and the international community; they consider them two sides of the same coin. Therefore, the success of one depends on the other. They must work closely as partners, showing good faith. It is often suggested that there is no capacity in the government of Afghanistan to implement projects, improve security and provide good governance. That is simply untrue. There are many qualified people who work in the ministries and departments. It is these people who run the government and can move the ship in the right direction; their expertise should be utilized and they should be involved in the planning and implementation of all programs. At present, in most ministries and departments, there is huge gap of communication between top, middle and low level leadership. Often overlooked due to their lack of English skills, they are considered the work horses of the Afghanistan government. They may not know how to charm donors, but they do know how to get things done. From 2003-2005, when I worked in the Ministry of Interior, I worked with many exceptionally qualified individuals and learned a lot from them. The existing social structure in all districts of Afghanistan allows the local populace to make their own decisions. This is non-recognizable structure that people solve their day to day issues through jirgas and shuras (council) and they understood it. They choose their representatives very easily and they can contribute to security and governance. It is an indigenous form of social equality. Each district is divided into sections, large villages (Qarya) or tribes.[7] If representatives of the Government of Afghanistan (governor, district governor, police chief) play an impartial role in governing, the people will trust and support the government. Unfortunately, in most cases, the government machinery especially at the local level is not filled with impartial actors. In most cases, local powerful has executive power and it is very difficult for them to dissociate themselves from the comrades in the fighting for decades and to be nice to their rivals or enemies. In many cases, due to partiality of local officials, some segments of community were excluded from decision making or even suppressed. If local government officials are perceived as biased to one group or another, local communities, particularly in Pashtun areas, will not only refrain from supporting the state but may seek to undermine its authority. The state should avoid becoming embroiled in complex local rivalries and feuds among families and tribal groups. As the former Speaker of the US House of Representatives Thomas ‘Tip’ O’Neill, once famously said, “All politics is local.” Nowhere is this more perfectly exemplified than in Afghanistan. The people of Afghanistan believe it is more important to know what is happening locally than to know what is happening in Kabul. The exclusion of local communities in governance and planning, and the imposition of lengthy technocratic strategies incomprehensible to local actors has alienated local communities and fueled insecurity. The insurgents infiltrate among the communities and groups who are alienated by the local officials. In order to improve governance, address insecurity and implement development projects, the Government of Afghanistan and international community should adopt a simpler approach. What is needed are a few bold and simple decisions—made at the local level—to bring real change and ensure efficiency. The Government of Afghanistan must remove all individuals who are obstacles to improving security and good governance. If the government and the international community appease corrupt individuals, they will further lose the support of the Afghan people. Political will among the Afghan government and international donor community is needed to make the tough decisions needed to turn the ship in the right direction. Afghans have been at war for thirty years. The political maturity of ordinary Afghan citizens is much greater than the average citizens of most other countries, even with high rates of illiteracy. If the people of Afghanistan see that the ship is turning in the right direction, even at a slow pace, they will understand. They will find the patience to wait. But if they see the ship moving in the wrong direction, the government will lose all support and the country will descend back into chaos. Ten Steps to Achieve Peace and Stability Afghanistan has been in a downward spiral since 2005. The security problem has escalated and is widespread throughout the country. It is estimated that 20 percent of the problems in Afghanistan are caused by Taliban and al-Qaeda activities, while 80 percent are linked to bad governance, drugs, warlords, communal disputes and local rivalries.[8]Centers of gravity are elaborated above before or priority areas need to be created in Kabul as well as in other regions. Counter insurgency operations should be led and coordinated from these centers of gravity to isolate and demolish the insurgency. A team comprised of police, military and civilians from Kabul should be assigned to each center of gravity to consult with the local authorities. The team leader must be an honest, trusted professional appointed by the President in consultation with the international community. Observers to monitor the process could be from UNAMA, PRTs, civil society or other local organizations. The team should be based in the region with full authority to make decisions including the hiring and firing of personnel, the direction of police operations and the distribution of resources. After selecting a team for each priority area or center of gravity, the team should start their work in the urban districts (Naheyas)[9]. If the center of province is not secured, it is not easy to move to rural district to improve security and governance. In this way, clear, hold and build formula of country insurgency should be implemented.[10] The team should establish a Shura (local council) in each Naheya (urban district) or rural district to discuss security, governance and development problems within the district and to derive solutions to address them. The locals know how to find solutions to their problems. Various different actors should be included in each Shura to ensure representation from all three pillars of power in Afghanistan: government, community and religious authorities. The government and international community should support their recommendations. For instance, every Naheya consists of several Guzars (sections), which are led by chiefs called Wakeel-e-Guzar.[11] All chiefs of Guzars should be part of this urban district Shura. Similarly, the leaders of prayers of each Jami mosque (those mosques which perform Friday prayer) in the district should be included in the Shura. Lastly, the Police Chief of the district and the head of the Naheya should also be members of this Shura. In the urban districts, this process should not take more than a week, while in a rural district the process may take two weeks. There is no need to pay the members of a Shura as they would participate voluntarily. Two elements are very important in the selection of Shura. One, to make sure that each section, sub-tribes or Qaryas (villages) should be consulted in the establishment of Shura and secondly each section should be able to select and appoint their representatives not choosing by government officials. In 1994-1995, I used to work for UNDP/UNOPS in eastern Afghanistan to establish District Rehabilitation Shura (DRS) in each district. Once, I sent my team to Khost province to establish a Shura in the capital of Khost with consultation of people. When the team established Shura and returned to Peshawar, a month later we went to Khost to see how the Shura is functioning. When we went to Khost and talked with the people, they said that they did not accept this Shura because our office called the elders and selected this Shura. We told them that is fine and let’s go back to villages and reselect members for Shura with consultation of the people. They selected almost the same people again and I asked them that what it is make different that you selected the same people again. People in the village told me that I didn’t understand the reason. When these people were selected in the office, they would not be accountable to the people but when the were selected in the villages, then the Shura members will be accountable to the people. It is a democratic process in the Afghanistan context as caucuses of Iowa in the US. Government officials must play an impartial role in the selection of the Shura in order for it to be representative and legitimate. It is up to the local population to decide who will represent them in the council. They may choose an educated person, tribal elder, Mullah or even in some cases an anti-government actor. If the latter is the case, it will provide an opportunity for those actors to reconcile with the government and reintegrate into the society. After establishing the Shura, all competing Shuras should be abolished. Numerous types of Shuras have been established since the fall of the Taliban by different government and non-government institutions such as IDLG Shura, CDCs, Ulema, Tribal, ministry of education and so on. This new Shura in a district should function until the government is able to hold district council elections as envisioned in the constitution of Afghanistan. Investment in the police force is a necessity rather than a choice; a functional state requires an efficient and effective police force, and the cost of investment in security will invariably be lower than the cost of insecurity. The first step for the team would be to conduct a two-week security survey with the provincial police and district police chiefs. This survey would determine how many police officers are needed to protect each district and implement the rule of law. Currently, there are wide variations in the estimates of police personnel requirements. At present, police officers are assigned to each district based on whether it is a category one, two or three district[12]. The team should have the authority to approve the recruitment of new police officers in each district on the basis of their survey and consultation. New police officers could be recruited very quickly with the consultation of the police chief and the inhabitants of each district Shura. The new recruitment should be part of regular police not part of Auxiliary Police, Arbaki (so called community police), Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) or Community Defense Initiative (CDI) which is proposed by ISAF. In Afghanistan, militias or forces created outside of the regular police structure, didn’t have good reputation and they were main problem of undermining of security and rules of law.[13] The new recruits should receive accelerated training by the Ministry of Interior (MoI) trainers at one of the country’s regional training centers. There is no shortage of qualified trainers in the MoI to expedite the training or even officers in the district can provide preliminary training in their respective areas. The first item on the agenda of the Shura should be unresolved communal problems. The Shura acts as an arbitrator and can rule on any conflict. There may be long-standing unresolved disputes between tribes or villages that must be addressed through the Shura, in conjunction with the regional team. It is important to address these issues first because insurgents often use local disputes as a means to infiltrate and influence local populations. Clear benchmarks to improve security and governance should be established by the Shura in conjunction with the regional team. Local issues may include determining the existing number of security incidents, burglaries, criminal activities, communal disputes, domestic violence, and so forth, with the goal of capturing and trying the perpetrators. Incidents can be addressed and resolved either through the legal process or through arbitration by the Shuras. Under the current conditions of insecurity in Afghanistan, people solve more than 80 percent of their local issues through informal system.[14] In addition, monthly monitoring to determine progress could be exercised by the police who already have procedures in place to register incidents. This process would require regular follow up. The second phase of the survey should be directed at ensuring district administration is responsible and reliable. The Chief of the Naheya (Raes-e-Naheya) who is equivalent to a Woleswal (District Governor) and is the head of all government units in a Naheya (district) must monitor the civil servants’ activities and ensure that all grievances are addressed. Monitoring the performance of government officials is very important due to the endemic problems of corruption and absenteeism. The team should therefore be given the authority to remove incompetent officials. Any new staff should be appointed in consultation with the populace, the line departments, the governor and the police chief of the province.As I mentioned that the team leader should have power of hire and fire if he sees that district governor is not good, then should consult with governor and local people and make decision and inform central government line department about their decision in order to process paper work. This whole paper is based on stability agenda to create space for reforms, changes and delegation of authority to local level. No. one priority for Afghans is security and in the absence of security nothing is possible to improve governance and to do development. If there is a need for higher-level consultation to remove a governor or director, the President or a relevant minister should be engaged. Addressing problems and inadequate performance will demonstrate the resolve of the government and its commitment to good governance. Community rewards for local improvements in security and governance should come in the form of district block grants of 2-3 million dollars. The disbursement of the grants should be directed by the Shura. Only the local population can legitimately determine which projects are most important in their community. Projects may include the building of roads, water supply systems, or recreational facilities as well as garbage collection and the development of sanitation systems. There would be no need to create an institution to implement these projects as the National Solidarity Program (NSP) of the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) already has a good system in place. Money for these initiatives could be channeled through the NSP. Once the plans are developed and drawn up by the engineers, it becomes the Shura’s responsibility to ensure that the contractors and engineers are supported and secure. If the existing resources for governance and development money of CERP (Commanders Emergency Response Program Fund), US, UK, German and Japanese development agencies used in the right way, it will be more than enough to implement this plan, bring stability and transparency in the governance and reduce corruption in Afghanistan. Presently, there are thousands of engineers in different departments of the government who are idle or not spending their time efficiently. Creating one department with responsibility for managing this important resource, a Corps of Engineers based on the U.S. model, would be a positive step. This body could assemble teams on an ad hoc basis to survey, design and execute projects requested by district Shuras. From 2007-2009, I attended on behalf of UNAMA sub-group of policy committee on reconstruction and development (R & D PAG) and it was priority number for the international community and the President of Afghanistan to build mosque of Musa Qala district in Helmand. Even though, the money was available but the line ministries was not able to prepare design of the mosque and accomplish the job. Musa Qala district was taken and retaken by the insurgents and government two times but the story of building of the mosque was not completed. It is very important for the government and International Community what they promise, they have to deliver in short span of time. Time & Resources Needed to Implement the Plan Depending on how many teams could be assembled, this process could be done simultaneously in several places. In stable areas, for example in the north or central Afghanistan, the process can be implemented very quickly and would not be time consuming. Where representative Shura exist in a district, there is no need to re-do the process again and the government should utilize it if, in some places, real representative Shura not exist, then there is need to establish representative Shura. Since the Shura is a familiar governance structure for most Afghans, the time period required to form them will not be excessive. None of these suggestions would require much funding. It would mostly require the community’s own human resources. If, after the process is complete and a district finds that it has valid needs for additional funding, it would be prudent for the government and the international community to provide that funding quickly, without bureaucratic roadblocks. With prompt action, the confidence of the people will grow and they will begin to trust the government. It is very important that the process is not manipulated by political leaders or other individuals (inside or outside of the government) who have a vested interest or personal agenda. Communications Strategy The various aspects of this strategy---the security surveys, the establishment of shuras, the delivery of block grants---should be well publicized through the media for public awareness. All government and international community actors should agree upon the message and ‘sing the same song’ to the media. Conflicting statements create confusion, mistrust and lack of confidence in the government and international community. Dissemination of information to counter disinformation or misinformation should be one of the most important parts of implementing these decisions. The media should be informed of developments three times per day. Otherwise, they will receive information from other sources. The Taliban are more effective in their propaganda war than the government and international community. However, there are plenty of good stories that need to be collected and disseminated through the media in a constant, strategic manner. Key Elements of the Long-Term Plan In order to maintain the momentum created by the ten step reform process described above, there must be changes to the long-term strategy in Afghanistan. The government and international community must take action to: Ensure Fair and Accurate Representation There must a re-structuring of government administrative units to ensure that there is one representative from each unit elected for Parliament and the Provincial Council. For example, there is 249 seats in the parliament, there should be 249 constituencies in the country. Under the current system, each province is one constituency and some cases you have 2 or three members of parliament from one district and many other districts don not have representatives in the parliament and provincial councils. Currently, many districts are not represented by elected officials. This should be rectified as soon as possible. Develop Five Year Plans Afghanistan cannot be as developed in the same manner as Europe or the United States because of lack of resources and geographical local and mostly depened on foreign assistance for decades. To develop vibrant economy takes long time. . Therefore, it is imperative to have realistic and implementable strategies to boost the morale of the local population and gain their support for the government and the international community. There should be a five-year strategic plan because in one or two years, it is not possible to see impact of development projects for every district and province as well as the national government. If resources are distributed evenly to everyone, then no one will be able to criticize the government or the international community. On the one hand, people in peaceful provinces, primarily the north, often complain that they are ignored because there is no fighting in their region. On the other hand, people in insecure areas, particularly the south and east, argue that the government and the international community have intentionally imposed the war on them to keep them underdeveloped. They are angry because their children remain uneducated and they perceive a conspiracy against Pashtuns. Reduce Waste In the long term, there will be a need to restructure a great deal of the current government machinery. Unnecessary departments or ministries which have been created for political purposes must be abolished. A review of each ministry to simplify administrative procedures would be a fruitful exercise and should be based on the ability of institutions to deliver services to the public. Prohibit “One-Off” Funding The budget process of the government should be altered to include all current costs in the regular budget, disallowing any and all personnel and departments from requesting funding outside of the budget. Good public finance management is a key enabling factor for implementation of Afghanistan’s development strategy and for achieving central national objectives of state-building, sustained rapid economic growth, and poverty reduction.[15] Re-focus Civil Service Reforms The Civil Service Commission needs to be redesigned because the current method of civil service reform created job insecurity and there is less focus on training, recruiting of civil servants and job security Its reforms served to create job insecurity rather than a more rational, effective and streamlined public service Conduct a Constitutional Review A review of the constitution is needed to adopt amendments for several controversial and contradictory articles.as the system of the government, balancing power, election cycling and several other article which contradicting each other or need clarification. The Challenge of Changing Course Since we do not yet have a model of governance in any district or province that can be replicated, I would suggest that the model crafted above be tested first in one or several regions as a pilot program. From those results, any necessary changes to the model could be incorporated before rolling the program out to the remainder of the country. My suggestion would be to initiate the program in Kabul or few other provinces in different regions to build a model which can be replicated in other areas. Stakeholders would then be able to monitor the process and progress, as well as provide the necessary support for the success of the program. These simple ideas could be easily implemented in Afghanistan right now. They would not take a long time and they would not cost much money. There is no need to create more institutions, write more strategies and pass more laws to implement the above programs. It primarily requires human resources. The people of Afghanistan do not have high expectations. They only wish to be safe in their homes, to have food on their table and to be able to move around their country without fear. There is no more time for long, drawn out deliberations. It is time for action. Time is not in the side of Afghan government and international community. Glossary AGE : Afghanistan Government Enemies (Taliban, Al-Qaeda & all other govt. destabilizers) ANA : Afghan National Army GoIRA : Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan IC : International Community ISAF : International Security Assistance Force MOI : Ministry of Interior MRRD : Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development NSP : National Solidarity Program PRT : Provincial Reconstruction Team UNAMA: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan Dari/Pashto Terms Guzar : Section of a District Hawza : Police District Jami Mosque : Mosque that performs Friday prayer Malik : Tribal Leader or Chieftain Naheya : Urban District Qarya : Big Villages Raes-e-Naheya : Chief of a Naheya, equivalent to a Woleswal Shura : Council Wakeel-e-Guzar : Chief of a Guzar Woleswal : District Governor Wuleswali : Local Districts Many thanks to Donna Singmaster of Fallbrook, CA for her assistance in editing. Shahmahmood Miakhel [1] The edited version of this paper is published by CIGI (Center for International Governance and Innovation) in Canada in May 2010. The link is: http://www.cigionline.org/publications/2010/4/plan-stabilize-afghanistan [2] Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) was approved by Afghanistan’s government in 2008 [3] Afghanistan Compact agreed between Afghanistan government and international community in London. (31 January-1 February 2006). [4]Since 2007, IDLG (Independent Directorate of Local Governance) with consultation of government departments drafted SNGP but pending for government approval. [5] High Office of Oversight (HOO) was established by the Government of Afghanistan in 2008 to fight corruption. [6] Afghanistan has about 166 thousands mosques, about 100,000 students in official 322 Madrassas. 6000 leaders of prayers and 7500 religious scholars were paid by the government. (source: Author’s interview with Dr. Mohammad Shafeq Samem, Deputy Minister of Haji and Awqaf on 15 March 2009. [7] Shahmahmood, Miakhel (2009). Understanding Afghanistan: The Importance of Tribal Culture and Structure in Security and Governance.Revised November 2009. Originally published as The Importance of Tribal Structures and Pakhtunwali in Afghanistan; Their role in security and governance., published by Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad Institute Center for South Asian Studies (2008). [8] Unpublished internal survey of JMAC (Joint Mission Analysis Center) of UNAMA in 2008. [9] Afghanistan has official 364 rural district and 132 urban districts (source IDLG). [10] Kabul City has twenty-two Naheyas. Interestingly, there are only seventeen police districts (Hawza). Structurally, however, there should be twenty-two police hawzas in Kabul City to correspond with the number of Naheyas. But there remain unsettled issues between the Municipality and Province of Kabul which should be fixed. Kabul Province has fourteen local districts (Wuleswali) each of which has a police chief. Jalalabad city has five Naheyas. [11] It is important to understand the role of Wakeel Guzar or Maliks in local society. Wakeel Guzar or Maliks are always appointed by a majority of the people in their Guzar (section of a district). They are registered with theNaheya or Wuleswali and each are given their own stamp. Wakeel Guzar orMaliks form the link between village and district administration. One cannot get proof of residency, ID cards, marriage certificate, and so forth, without the attestation of a Wakeel Guazar or Malik. [12] All Provinces and Districts in Afghanistan are divided by category one, two and three based on population and geography. There are 7 grade one, 10 grade two and 17 grade three Provinces in Afghanistan. In addition, there are 66 category one, 177 category two and 121 category three Districts. [13] In 2008, I wrote whit paper on Arbaki roles which is widely distributed. [14] National Human Development Report (2007). I mentioned more than 80% because the security situation is getting worse than 2007. If there is more insecurity and less access to formal system, the role of informal system increase. [15] World Bank Report No. 34582-AF (Afghanistan Managing Public Finances for Development) Main Report (Volume I) December 22, 2005